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Abstract
This paper investigates the historical process of industrialisation. The allocation of labour be-
tween food and non-food activities and the pattern of consumption of domestic versus industrial
manufacture are determined endogenously, depending on terms of trade between agricultural and
industrial goods. It is demonstrated that growth in the industrial sector’s productivity is crucial
to the expansion and development of the agricultural sector and thus to the transfer of labour
from agriculture to industry and to economic growth. This view contrasts with the traditional
perception according to which the agricultural sector leads in the process of industrialisation.
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One of the most important elements in the historical process of industrialisation is the
release of labour from food-generating activities. By 1500, the share of the English labour
force engaged in agriculture was 74 percent (Allen, 2000). By 1800, that share consisted of
35 percent (ibid.). Even adjusting for food imports, which by the beginning of the nineteenth
century was about one ﬁfth of all English food consumption (Craft, 1985a), this change in
the occupational structure reﬂects an astonishing performance of the agricultural sector over
the period.
Surprisingly though, almost any standard textbook in history insists that growth in the
industrial sector’s productivity, such as the mechanization of the English textile industry,
is synonymous with the Industrial Revolution. But why are technological breakthroughs in
the industrial sector said to be responsible for the Industrial Revolution when it would seem
that it is productivity improvements in the agricultural sector that enabled the transfer of
labour from agriculture to industry?
This paper explores a possible link between improvements in the productivity of industrial
workers and the performance of farmers. The work is inspired by the two salient observations
about the pre-industrial economy made by Boserup (1965) and others, namely, that surplus
labour existed in agriculture and could be allocated in a variety of ways, and that agricultural
productivity was limited, not by the state of knowledge of how to increase output per unit
of land, but by the fact that an increase in farmland productivity came at a cost to labour.
The allocation of labour between food and non-food activities and the pattern of con-
1sumption of domestic versus industrial manufacture are determined endogenously, depending
on terms of trade between agricultural and industrial goods. It is demonstrated that growth
in the industrial sector’s productivity is crucial to the expansion and development of the
agricultural sector and thus to the transfer of labour from agriculture to industry and to
economic growth, a view that deviates from the traditional perspective, which suggests that
it is the agricultural sector that leads in the process of industrialisation.
More speciﬁcally, the model shows that an increase in the industrial sector’s productivity
improves agricultural terms of trade, i.e., increases the price that a farmer receives for his
food. This motivates the farmer to allocate more labour to agrarian activities, a change
that comes about at a cost to his consumption of non-agrarian goods that are produced
domestically. However, his lower consumption of domestic goods is compensated for by a
larger consumption of industrial goods, obtained from selling his food surplus in the market.
The analysis also demonstrates that, given an inelastic demand for food, growth in the
size of the farmer’s food surplus releases labour from agrarian activities, thus increasing the
share of workers employed in the industrial sector. Over all, this explains why technological
breakthroughs in industrial manufacture would lead to intensiﬁcation in the use of farm-
land, thereby stimulating the process of industrialisation and the consumption of industrial
goods at the expense of the production and consumption of domestic goods. The process of
industrialisation outlined in this paper is, therefore, essentially demand-driven.
In an extension of the model the eﬀect that an increase in the size of the population
has on the structural composition of the labour force is discussed. By assuming that the
level of technology is an increasing function of the size of the population, we show that if
2the industrial sector uses the available technology more eﬃciently than does the domestic
sector, then this, in a historical perspective, means that more densely populated regions
will be more industrialised compared to sparsely populated ones, even though all regions
use the same level of agricultural technology. The implicit reason is that farmers in densely
populated areas spend more hours of work in their ﬁelds at a cost to domestic activities.
The paper proceeds as follows. After discussing the related literature, section 2 presents
the historical evidence upon which the model is built. Section 3 presents the model, section
4 performs a comparative static analysis, while section 5 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
The model presented below is inspired by the historical developments in the western world,
particularly in England, as are a large series of theoretical studies that also examine the
long transition from economic stagnation to sus t a i n e dg r o w t ha s s o c i a t e dw i t ht h eI n d u s t r i a l
Revolution; these include Goodfriend and McDermott (1995), Galor and Weil (2000), Galor
and Moav (2002), Galor et al. (2002), Hansen and Prescott (2002), Jones (2001), Lagerlöf
(2003), Lucas (2002), Tamura (2002), and Weisdorf (2003).
Common to most of these papers is a Malthusian building block in which a ﬁxed amount
of land generates decreasing returns to labour when technology is held constant. Economic
growth then reﬂects the interaction between new technology, diminishing returns to labour,
and demographic growth. But whereas the Malthusian model implies that productive oppor-
tunities in agriculture are always fully exploited, the model in this paper suggests, inspired
by Boserup’s theory about agricultural development, that farmers are in fact able to in-
3crease their farmland productivity by moving labour-resources from other activities such as
household production and leisure time.
The inclusion of Boserup’s theory in long-run growth models is not entirely new. For
example, Lee (1988) proposes a Boserupian construction by which greater population den-
sity encourages technical progress; Strulik (1997) employs a learning-by-doing mechanism
that acts as a positive externality, which increases with the size of the population and helps
it to overcome diminishing returns to labour; Klausen and Nestmann (2000) use Boserup’s
demand-driven technological change in an extension of the growth model presented in Kremer
(1993); and Lagerlöf (2002) includes a Boserupian feature in which agricultural productivity
progresses as a result of population pressure. All of these papers, however, lack signiﬁ-
cant aspects of Boserup’s theory concerning the labour costs associated with an increase in
farmland productivity.
An issue that is closely related to the work of Boserup, concerns the role of agriculture in
the process of development. Whereas the new growth theory often neglects the importance of
food production, development economists have long stressed that due to the income-inelastic
demand for agricultural products, improvements in the agricultural sector’s productivity are
as i g n i ﬁcant source of economic growth since they enable the reallocation of labour from
agrarian to non-agrarian activities.
This issue is taken into consideration in a body of papers, mainly following in the footsteps
of Jorgenson (1961, 1967), that examine the structural transformation of a dual economy
(e.g., Chanda and Dalgaard, 2003; Duranton, 1998; Echevarria, 1997; Galor and Mountford,
2003; Gollin et al., 2002; Kongasmut et al., 2001; Kögel and Prskawetz, 2001; Laitner, 2000;
4Matsuyama, 1992). The main insight gained from these papers, most of which address the
cause of the disparity in income per capita in contemporary countries, is that non-homotetic
preferences, with an income-elasticity of demand for agricultural goods below unity, create
a positive link between improvements in agricultural productivity and economic growth.
The work presented in this paper is most closely related to the studies by Duranton
(1998), Galor and Mountford (2003), and Kögel and Prskawetz (2001). Kögel and Prskawetz,
who allow for increasing returns to labour in manufacturing, demonstrate, holding constant
t h es h a r eo fw o r k e r se m p l o y e di na g r i c u l t u r e ,t h a tt h e r ee x i s t sab a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hu p o n
which growth in the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity will lead to economic as
well as demographic growth. However, their model does not explain the declining share of
workers employed in the agricultural sector, which plays an important role in the process of
industrialisation. Nor do changes in the level of the industrial sector’s productivity inﬂuence
t h ef a r m e r s ’b e h a v i o u r ,a si st h ec a s ei no u rm o d e l .
Both Duranton’s and Galor and Mountford’s studies consider the role of international
trade in the process of development. Duranton engages in the puzzling question of why
some–often newly industrialised–countries are able to combine a low total factor produc-
tivity in agriculture with a high degree of industrialisation, a fact that Duranton shows can
be attributed to the mere circumstance that countries are open to trade. The model in the
current paper is capable of replicating the evidence presented in Duranton, even though we
consider a closed economy, because a high degree of industrialisation in our model can be
achieved with relatively inferior agricultural technology when farmers put a relatively large
amount of work into their ﬁelds.
5Galor and Mountford’s paper illustrates how the current distribution of world population
can be assigned to the diﬀerent eﬀects that international trade played in the timing of the
demographic transition in agricultural and industrialised countries. An important feature
of their work, which is in parallel to ours, is that the level of agricultural productivity is
determined endogenously. In their model, the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity
increases with the economy’s overall level of technology, which in turn is positively correlated
with the population’s level of human capital. Unlike our model, however, the food output
per unit of farmland is not the result of the farmer’s optimisation behaviour.
In general, our work diﬀers from the existing literature in three important ways. First,
we question the idea that pre-industrial farmers fully utilised their productive potential
in agriculture. Inspired by the thinking of Boserup and others, we show that when the
intensiﬁcation of farmland comes at a cost to labour and when utility is derived from spare-
time activities such as home production, farmers may not use the highest level of farmland
productivity possible, which is why the productive opportunities in the agricultural sector
need not be fully exploited.
Second, we propose a new way in which to endogenise agricultural productivity. With
the exception of Galor and Mountford’s model discussed above, improvements in the level of
agricultural productivity in the literature on dual economies always occur exogenously. In
the current paper, the number of hours that a farmer chooses to spend in his ﬁelds, which
implicitly determines the productivity of his farmland, is based upon optimization behaviour.
Third, we include domestic activities. Models that deal with long-run growth from a his-
torical perspective tend to neglect the fact that, in societies whose occupational structure is
6dominated by agriculture, a signiﬁcant part of the non-agrarian goods that farmers consume
are produced by themselves. This subject is examined in a number of papers, most of which
are rooted in Becker’s (1965) theory of time-allocation, that explores the labour-allocation of
an agrarian household (e.g., Devereux and Locay, 1992; Gronau, 1977; Hymer and Resnick,
1969; Locay, 1990).
Here, we mainly build upon the work by Hymer and Resnick (1969), who, in a partial
equilibrium analysis, investigate the role of non-agrarian activities in an agrarian economy.
Comparable to their study, we take the analysis further by implanting the agrarian sector’s
activities in a general equilibrium framework. We then use this framework to show that the
process of industrialisation, not only in a historical perspective but also in contemporary
developing countries, actually consists of a shift in the consumption of non-agrarian goods
from goods produced domestically to similar goods produced by an industrial sector.
2T h e E v i d e n c e
Contrary to the common belief, the process of industrialisation is not conﬁned to the past
two centuries. In the words of Hicks (1969, p. 141), “[t]he Industrial Revolution is the rise
of modern industry, not the rise of industry as such.” In today’s terms, Hicks is referring
to the concept of ‘proto-industrialisation’. Mendels, the initiator of this modern version of
this concept, writes that “[w]ell before the beginning of machine industry, many regions of
Europe became increasingly industrialized in the sense that a growing proportion of their
labor potential was allocated to industry” (Mendels, 1972, p. 241). Mendels’ statement
7encapsulates well the way in which this paper attempts to deﬁne an economy’s degree of
industrialisation, namely, as its share of workers devoted to industrial production.
Due to Engel’s law, which captures the fact that the demand for agricultural goods is
income-inelastic (e.g., Craft, 1985b), the transfer of labour from agrarian to non-agrarian
activities is inseparably linked to improvements in the agricultural sector’s performance.
Intuitively, one would therefore expect that the historical movement of workers into industrial
manufacture awaited advances in the knowledge of how to intensify the use of farmland.
Unlike the classical economists, such as Malthus and Ricardo, who took it for granted that
the productive opportunities in agriculture are always fully exploited, one of the most striking
aspects of Boserup’s (1965) theory about agricultural development is that the intensity with
which farmland is cultivated is not limited by the state of knowledge about how to increase
output per unit of land. Instead, she convincingly argues that pre-industrial peasants were
virtually always capable of increasing farmland productivity by increasing the number of
hours that they spent in their ﬁelds.
More contemporary studies support Boserup’s theory. Grantham (1999, p. 212), for
example, asserts that intensive cultivation during the Middle Ages, “demanded more labour
and capital per acre of land than traditional farming, and therefore cost more per hectare,
but they did not require advances in knowledge.”1 In order to increase the output per acre
of land, Grantham argues that ﬁelds were seeded more thickly and that farmers weeded,
ploughed, harrowed and hoed their ﬁelds more frequently and more intensively (ibid.). Sim-
1 In fact, Grantham claims that the techniques that were used to increase output per acre of land during
the Middle Ages had been around since the Iron Age.
8ilarly, Hatcher and Bailey (2001, p. 154) postulate that the high levels of Medieval farmland
productivity recorded in eastern Norfolk, England, “were achieved largely by the use of
labour-intensive methods of farming such as weeding, marling, and manuring, rather than
through any revolutionary innovations in agricultural technology.” Clark (1987), providing
evidence that output per farm worker in the northern United States and Britain in the early
nineteenth century was many times that in Eastern Europe, claims that “[t]echnical progress
explains little of the high American and British productivity [...], nor, in the American case,
does abundant land per worker. Instead, most of the diﬀerences derived from more intense
labor” (ibid., p. 419). But did surplus labour really exist among pre-industrial farmers, and
if so, then what made the farmers agree to the inherent decline in other activities that would
accompany an increase in farmland productivity?
It has been argued that the systems of land use and cultivation can be understood only
if considered as a part of the pattern of social organisation as a whole. The pre-industrial
economy is commonly thought of as being dominated by agriculture, when in fact, as pointed
out by, for example, Reynolds (2000), it is actually dominated by household production.
Reynolds postulates that up to 1700, 80-90 percent of the European population lived in
rural areas, on isolated farms or in small villages close to the farmland. In these rural
households, Reynolds notes (ibid., p. 80), “[e]ach family produces not only most of its own
food, but most of its housing and clothing, plus a wide range of services.”
Industrial manufacture gains a foothold to the extent that farmers decide to abandon
their self-suﬃcient life-style by allocating labour-resources to the production of marketable
agrarian goods that can then be exchanged for goods produced by specialised manufac-
9turers. But from where did peasants get the labour needed to improve their agricultural
performance? Based mostly on studies of developing countries, Boserup (1981) reckons that
before the Industrial Revolution, agriculture was, primarily due to its seasonal character, a
part-time occupation. She claims (ibid., p. 120) that farmers used their spare time in the
production of non-agricultural goods for own-use consumption or, as also proposed by de
Vries (1972), in leisurely activities. Similarly, Reynolds (2000, p. 80) asserts that out of the
time available to the pre-industrial rural household “agricultural activities take perhaps 50 to
60 percent of the total, the remainder going to ‘industrial’ and service activities” (Reynolds’
quotation marks).
Due to a lack of data, only a few studies have dealt seriously with the existence of surplus
labour in pre-industrial agriculture (see, e.g., Allen, 1988; Campbell and Overton, 1991;
Clark, 1991). Recently, a study by Karakacili (2004) has provided overwhelming support
that surplus labour was indeed present during the middle ages, even at the time which is
thought to have had the lowest agrarian labour productivity rates in the pre-industrial era,
namely, in the period shortly prior to the Black Death.
Presuming that surplus labour did exist in pre-industrial agriculture, then to what extent
did farmers allocate this labour to the production of marketed goods? According to de Vries
(1994), the Industrial Revolution was preceded by an ‘industrious revolution’ during which
“a broad range of households made decisions that increased both the supply of marketed
commodities and labour and the demand for goods oﬀered in the marketplace” (ibid., p.
255).
If the pre-industrial farm household increased the amount of marketed foodstuﬀsb y
10increasing its farmland productivity, then this should be mirrored in the share of workers
needed in agriculture and thus in the occupation structure of the economy. Allen (2000),
reporting such data for pre-industrial Europe, estimates that the proportion of England’s
labour force engaged in agriculture declined from 74 percent in 1500 to 45 percent in 1750
(see Table 1). This seems to indicate that in the English case, a signiﬁcant increase in
farmland productivity occurred in the centuries leading up to the time of the Industrial
Revolution.
[Table 1 about here: Estimated English Population Distribution]
What inspired the farm household to improve the performance of its farmland? In the
early modern era there appears to have been an upward movement in agricultural terms of
trade, i.e., in the number of non-agrarian goods that a farmer would receive for a unit of food.
T h i ss h i f ti nt e r m so ft r a d eb e t w e e nt h et w ot y p e so fg o o d si sb e l i e v e dt oh a v ee n c o u r a g e d
the farmer to improve the productivity of his farmland with the aim of increasing the number
of agrarian goods that could then be traded in the market for non-agrarian goods.
For example, Craig and Fisher (2000, p. 46) note that “[t]he eﬀort to expand acreage and
production during the ﬁfteen and sixteenth centuries was prompted by favorable trends in
the demand for agricultural products, which was reﬂe c t e di nt h eu p w a r dm o v e m e n ti nf a r m
prices relative to all other prices.” A contribution by O’Brien (1985) that estimates prices of
agricultural as well as industrial goods for England between 1660 and 1820 reaches a similar
conclusion. Using O’Brien’s data, Figure 1 illustrates the development in agricultural terms
of trade over the period. Although the terms of trade decline slightly over the ﬁrst half of
11the observed period, the second half of the period, particularly at the onset of the Industrial
Revolution between ca. 1750 and 1800, indicate a signiﬁcant upward trend in the price that
farmers received for their products.
[Figure 1 about here: English Agriculture Terms of Trade]
In support of the view that improvements in agricultural terms of trade encouraged
the farmer to improve his output per unit of land, Reynolds (2000, p. 89) mentions that
“[a]s agricultural production becomes more labour-absorbing and more proﬁtable, and as
manufacturers can be purchased from outside on more favorable terms, the rural family sheds
some of its goods-producing functions and passes them over to the specialized producers.”
Along similar lines, Boserup (1990, p. 35) notes that around the time of the Industrial
Revolution, “[s]ome family members had produced textiles and other non-agrarian products
for home consumption, but when prices of such products declined steeply, home production
was replaced by the purchase of industrial products. Home workers either gave more help in
agriculture, or they began to work in or for the new factories.”
Although there is very little direct information about patterns of the farmer’s home work
versus his agrarian work in the early modern era, Voth (2000), who investigates the working
hours in England during the Industrial Revolution, estimates that a 19 percent decline in
the total number of workers in agriculture between 1760 and 1800 was accompanied by a 45
percent increase in the annual number of hours spent per person in agriculture (ibid.,t a b l e
3.34). Note that this enormous increase in agrarian working hours coincides with the strong
improvements in the price that a farmer received for his products over the same period (see
12Figure 1).
Since the transfer of household activities into commercial manufacture is reﬂected in
the occupational structure, and since commercial activities are more readily detected and
measured than are those performed by the household,2 one would expect to see a negative
relationship between the share of the total labour force engaged in agrarian activities and
the output per capita. Figure 2, which plots the share of workers in agriculture against the
(log) GNP per capita in 134 contemporary countries,3 clearly indicates that countries that
employ a relatively small proportion of their labour force in the agrarian sector, also enjoy
relatively higher standards of living. This seems to be consistent with the idea that economic
growth is strongly linked to the transfer of workers from agriculture to industrial activities.
[Figure 2 about here: Log GNP per Capita vs. the Share of Workers in Agriculture]
The discussion in this section suggests that the historical process of industrialisation ac-
tually consisted of a shift in the farm household’s consumption of manufactured goods, from
goods produced domestically to similar goods produced by the industrial sector. Moreover,
it appears that the shift was accompanied by an increase in farmland productivity that might
have arisen from growth in the number of hours that the farmer spent in the ﬁelds.
In the following, a simple framework that is capable of replicating this evidence is pre-
sented. The framework is then used to trace the underlying factors that prompted the
process of industrialisation.
2 See Devereux and Locay (1992) for a discussion.
3 The data stems from World Bank (1999, Tables 1.1 and 1.15). There were originally 148 countries in
the data set but 14 have been left out due to missing observations.
133T h e M o d e l
Consider a two-sector, one-period, non-overlapping generations model with agrarian as well
as non-agrarian production and consumption. The economy consists of N identical individ-
uals, out of which the share s ∈ (0,1], which is determined endogenously below, is engaged
in the agricultural sector. Non-agrarian goods are produced domestically as well as by an
industrial sector. Residually, the share 1 −s of the labour force is engaged in the industrial
sector.
Each individual is endowed with l units of time. As will become apparent below, this
time-endowment is divided between domestic production on the one hand, and agricultural
or industrial production–depending on the individual’s sectorial choice–on the other.
3.1 Agricultural Production
We assume that agricultural production has constant returns to land and labour. Throughout
the paper, we suppress the use of capital; this is not an uncommon simpliﬁcation in models
that investigate pre-industrial development.4




1−α,α ∈ (0,1), (1)
where l is the number of hours that a farmer spends producing food, x is the units of
farmland that he has at his disposal, and ΩA is the total factor productivity in agriculture.
We assume a ﬁxed amount of farmland of X units. As is customary in this ﬁeld of study,
4 The inclusion of capital goods will hardly aﬀect the qualitative results of the model.
14we also assume that there are no property rights over the land, i.e., land is divided equally
among the farmers and therefore yA is the farmer’s income, expressed in terms of food. With
N being the size of the total labour force and s being the share hereof engaged in agriculture,
each farmer thus receives x = X/sN units of farmland.
With a ﬁxed amount of land at the farmers’ disposal, the assumption that α ∈ (0,1)
implies that there are diminishing returns to labour in agrarian production. Note, though,
that a farmer is capable of increasing his output per unit of farmland by increasing the
number of hours that he spend in the ﬁelds, that is, by increasing l. However, since the
farmer derives utility from spare time activities (see below), he need not necessarily want to
set l equal to his time-endowment l.
Note also that the economy’s total agrarian output is
Y
A = y
A · sN = ΩA (lsN)
α X
1−α ≡ ΩA (lsN)
α ,X ≡ 1. (2)
Both the share of the labour force that is employed in agriculture, s, and the number of
hours that a farmer spends producing food, l, will be determined in the following.
3.1.1 Food Market Clearing
In accordance with Craft (1985b), we assume that the demand for food, unlike other goods
that we consider, is income-inelastic. More speciﬁcally, we assume that a units of agrarian
goods are required per individual in order to ensure the individual’s survival.
With N individuals who each demand a units of food, equilibrium in the market for food
implies that the total demand, aN, equals the total supply, Y A. The share of workers in
agriculture that is required to satisfy the economy’s food needs is thus determined endoge-
15nously from the food market equilibrium. Using equation (2), it follows that the share of








Accordingly, the share of workers employed in agriculture, s, increases with the size or, in
eﬀect, the density of the economy’s population, N, and decreases with the level of the total
factor productivity in agriculture, ΩA.
The latter result is a well-known conclusion from the existing literature. However, for
the story that we are going to tell here, the key is that the share of workers engaged in
agriculture also decreases to the extent that the farmers decide to increase their work hours
spent producing food, measured by the variable l.
3.2 Preferences
Suppose that having consumed the a units of food that are required for survival, the indi-
vidual then derives utility from the consumption of non-agrarian goods. As indicated above,
non-agrarian goods can be of an industrial type denoted m (for manufactured goods) and
of a home-made type denoted d (for domestic goods). Home-made or domestic goods are
produced by the individual in his or her spare-time. Manufactured goods are produced by
the share of the labour force, 1 − s, that is engaged in the industrial sector, henceforth
denoted as, manufacturers.
Domestic and manufactured goods are considered to be perfect substitutes. The repre-
sentative utility function is thus
u(m,d)=m + γd ≡ m + d, γ ≡ 1, (4)
16with γ being the subjective value of domestic goods relative to manufactured goods. For
convenience, γ is assumed to be the same for all individuals, and in the following is set to
one. Note that the consumption of the a units of food that the individual needs in order to
subsist does not provide any utility but is necessary for survival.5
3.3 Non-Agrarian Production
There are two types of technologies available for producing non-agrarian goods: domestic
technology (denoted D) and industrial technology (denoted M). Both are assumed to exhibit
constant returns to labour, which implicitly means that land for the purpose of non-agrarian
production is not constrained. The total non-agrarian output is thus
Y
i = Ωi · L, i = {D,M}, (5)
where L is labour and Ωi is the level of productivity in sector i = {D,M}.
We then deﬁne the relationship between the levels of productivity in the two sectors as
ΩM =( 1+Φ)ΩD, (6)
where the size of Φ, which we assume is larger than zero, measures the degree to which the
industrial sector’s productivity exceeds that of the domestic sector.
3.4 Occupation, Income, and Consumption
The individual can choose between being a farmer and a manufacturer. It is assumed that
once the occupational decision is made, then manufacturers do not have access to farmland
5 A similar construction is found in Kögel and Prskawetz (2001). It is possible, but severely complicates
matters, to have food consumption entering the utility function such that, once a given amount of food has
been consumed, individuals care about food as well as non-agrarian goods.
17and farmers do not have access to industrial technology.6
3.4.1 The Manufacturer’s Income and Consumption
The manufacturer’s income consists of the wage that he earns in the industrial sector, which
is ΩM times the number of hours that he decides to work. Since the manufacturer is more
productive at work than at home (i.e., ΩM > ΩD), he chooses not to produce domestic goods
at all and instead spends his entire time-endowment, l,a tw o r k . 7
A share of the income that the manufacturer generates at work is spent on the a units
of food that he needs in order to subsist. Since utility is derived from the consumption
of non-agrarian goods, once his food needs are fulﬁlled, the remaining income is spent on
manufactured goods. The number of manufactured goods that the manufacturer consumes
is thus
m
M = ΩMl − pa, (7)
where p is the price of food in terms of manufactured goods, i.e., agricultural terms of trade.
Since the manufacturer is not engaged in domestic production, his consumption of domestic
goods is zero, i.e.,
d
M =0 . (8)
6 The reason could be that the production of industrial goods takes place in urban areas that farmers
are unable to reach in their spare time. The same would be true for manufacturers, mutatis mutandis.I t
could also be that the industrial technology requires certain, non-explicated educational skills that farmers
do not have time to obtain. Or it could be that the industrial technology requires use on a daily basis that
farmers, due to their agrarian obligations, are prevented from obtaining.
7 We could allow for diminishing returns to labour in the non-agrarian production, which would mean that
there are circumstances under which manufacturers would enjoy domestic goods as well. Such a modiﬁcation
will, besides complicating the model, not aﬀect its qualitative results.
183.4.2 The Farmer’s Income and Consumption
The farmer’s income consists of the value of his food surplus. The food surplus is the
diﬀerence between his food output, yA, and the number of food units required for survival,
a. The price that the farmer receives, measured in terms of manufactured goods, is p per unit








Since the farmer does not have access to industrial technology, he spends his spare time,
i.e., the time left after agrarian activities, l−l, producing domestic goods. His consumption







Note that as long as l<l, the farmer is potentially able to increase his output per unit
of farmland and thus his food surplus. However, as this increase in farmland productivity
means that he needs to reduce his consumption of domestic goods, the farmer is reluctant
to use the highest farmland productivity possible, which, given the level of ΩA, is obtained
by setting l = l. In other words, an increase in the farmer’s output per unit of farmland,
a n dt h u sa ni n c r e a s ei nh i sc o n s u m p t i o no fm a n u f a c t u r e dg o o d s ,i so b t a i n e da tt h ee x p e n s e
of his production and consumption of domestic goods.
4A n a l y s i s
Using the set-up presented above, we are now ready to ﬁnd the number of hours, l,t h a ta
farmer chooses to spend in his ﬁelds. Then, we ﬁnd agricultural terms of trade, p,a n dt h e
19economy’s degree of industrialisation, 1−s, in order to see how these variables, particularly
the latter, respond to changes in productivity and demography.
4.1 Optimization
A farmer chooses the number of agrarian working hours, l, that maximises his utility. Insert-
ing the farmer’s consumption of manufactured as well as domestic goods, equations (9) and
(10), and the farmer’s production function, equation (1), into the utility function, equation















s u b j e c tt ot h et i m e - b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n tt h a tr e q u i r e st h a tl 6 l. An interior solution to the
maximisation problem implies that
pαΩA (lsN)
α−1 = ΩD, (12)
meaning that the marginal utility that a farmer gains from increasing his agrarian work
hours (the left-hand term), which stems from an increase in his income made from selling
a larger food surplus and thus an increase in his consumption of manufactured goods, in
optimum equals the marginal utility forgone from increasing his agrarian work hours (the
right-hand term), which is due to a decline in his consumption of domestic goods.
Note, in particular, that an increase in the price that a farmer receives for one unit of
food increases the marginal utility obtained from increasing his agrarian working hours.
204.2 Equilibrium
Suppose that there is free labour mobility. Occupational indiﬀerence then implies that
the individual receives the same level of welfare regardless of whether he is a farmer or a
manufacturer. The economy is therefore in equilibrium when all workers receive an identical




Inserting equations (7), (9), (8), (10), and (12) into (13), it follows that the price of food in











Note that p increases with both the degree to which the industrial sector’s productivity
exceeds that of the domestic sector, measured by the variable Φ,a n dw i t ht h es i z eo ft h e
population, N.H o w e v e r ,p decreases to the extent that the agricultural sector’s total factor
productivity, ΩA, increases.8
By inserting equation (14) into the solution to the farmer’s optimization problem, equa-






Accordingly, the number of hours that a farmer spends producing food increases with
the degree to which the industrial sector’s productivity exceeds that of the domestic sector,
8 Note also that, despite the fact that a farmer and a manufacturer receive the same level of utility, the
model indicates that if the value of domestic production is not taken into consideration, then an income-
study will show that the wage of a manufacturer exceeds that of a farmer. In other words, urban wages tend
to be larger then rural wages.
21Φ, but is unaﬀected by changes in the size of the economy’s population, N, or by changes
in the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity, ΩA.
Finally, the share of workers that is employed in the agricultural sector in equilibrium
is found by inserting equation (15) into equation (3). It thus follows that the share of the










which increases with the size of the population, N, but decreases with the degree, Φ,t o
which the industrial sector’s productivity exceeds that in domestic production, and with the
total factor productivity in agriculture, ΩA.
4.3 Productivity Changes
W ew a n tt oe x a m i n et h ew a yi nw h i c hc h a n g e si nt h el e v e lo fp r o d u c t i v i t yi ne a c ho ft h e
three sectors inﬂuence the economy’s degree of industrialisation. The following proposition
summarises the results.
Proposition 1 The model predicts that
(i) an increase in the industrial sector’s productivity, ΩM, relative to that in the domestic
sector, ΩD–that is, an increase in Φ–increases the farmer’s agrarian work hours, l,w h i c h
reduces the share of workers in agriculture, s, and thus transfers labour from agriculture to
industry.
(ii) an increase in the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity, ΩA,r e d u c e st h es h a r e
of workers in agriculture, s, and thus transfers labour from agriculture to industry, without
aﬀecting the farmer’s agrarian work hours, l.
Proposition 1 follows trivially from the solution to the optimization problem, and thus
from the derivatives of equations (15) and (16) with respect to Φ and ΩA. The model
accordingly suggests that an increase in the farmer’s agrarian work hours, which increases
22the size of his food surplus and thus transfers workers from agriculture to industry, will
result from inventions that improve the industrial sector’s productivity. Similarly, the model
shows that the introduction of inventions that improve the agricultural sector’s productivity,
even though they do not aﬀect the farmer’s agrarian work hours, also transfer workers from
agriculture to industry.
The latter is the trivial result, well known from the existing literature. The news here
is, therefore, the former result, according to which the historical release of workers from
food-generating activities could have arisen from the introduction of new technology in the
industrial sector, even in the absence of new technology being introduced into agriculture.
This thus aﬃrms the history textbooks’ conviction that events such as the mechanization of
the English textile industry actually prompted the process of industrialisation.
4.4 Demographic Changes
One of the most salient features of the early modern era, one that most likely aﬀected the
process of industrialisation, is the increase in the size of the population. According to Allen
(2000), the English population more than trebled over the three centuries from 1500 to 1800
(see Table 1 on page 11).
One of the key determinants in the process of agricultural development, according to
Boserup (1965), is the pressure of an increasing population. She predicts (ibid., p. 71) that
“output per man-hour in agriculture tends to decline with increasing population density, but
[...] this decline is likely to be oﬀset, more or less, by longer hours.”9
9 Boserup also mentions that a relatively large agricultural population within a given territory under pre-
industrial systems of cultivation can support an absolute larger non-agrarian population than a relatively
23How does the model presented above accord with the predictions of Boserup? It follows
from the solution to the optimization problem, and thus from the derivative of equations
(15) and (16) with respect to N,t h a t ,
Proposition 2 An increase in the size of the population, N, increases the share of labour
employed in agriculture, s, without aﬀecting the farmer’s agrarian work hours, l.
The Proposition thus indicates that an increase in the size of the population reduces the
degree of industrialisation. All other things being equal, the decline in output per man-hour
that stems from an increasing population is due to the fact that a larger population reduces
the amount of farmland available to each farmer. However, the farmer does not, as proposed
by Boserup, respond by putting more hours of work into his ﬁelds. Instead, there is an
increase in the share of workers that are engaged in the agricultural sector. That is, more
labour does enter agriculture in order to fulﬁl the increase in the demand for food that arises
from a larger population, but the individual farmer’s work hours are not aﬀected.
However, if we consider an economy in which the entire labour force is devoted to agri-
cultural activities, then the model actually does replicate the prediction of Boserup. From
setting s equal to one in equation (3), isolating l a n dt h e nd i ﬀerentiating with respect to N,
it follows that,
Corollary 1 In a subsistence economy–deﬁned as an economy in which the entire labour
force is engaged in agriculture–an increase in the size of the population, N,i n c r e a s e st h e
farmer’s agrarian work hours, l.
smaller one. However, this is not the same as saying that a larger population will cause an increase in the
degree of industrialisation. In fact, Boserup imagines (ibid.) that a higher degree of urbanisation, which
is a proxy for the share of workers in industrial activities, is attained from improvements in agricultural
productivity through the industrial sector’s delivery of better tools to agriculture, and the provision of
better administration, and education, and so forth.
24Corollary 1 implicitly states that an increase in the size of the population, leaving each
farmer with less farmland to cultivate, forces the farmer to increase his agrarian work hours
in order to be able to produce the amount of food that is needed for his survival.
In any case it is clear that a larger population appears to make it increasingly diﬃcult
for an economy to become industrialised, a result that seems to contradict the pre-industrial
evidence. Because, according to Allen (2000), the share of the English labour force devoted
to agricultural activities declined from 76 percent in 1500, to 69 percent in 1600, and 55
percent in 1700, until it reached 36 percent in 1800. These structural changes occurred
despite the signiﬁcant increase in the size of the English population (see Table 1). Although
it is possible that higher total factor productivity in the agricultural and/or the industrial
sector counterbalanced the adverse eﬀe c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h es i z eo ft h ep o p u l a t i o nh a do n
the share of workers employed in the industrial sector, it appears to be more likely that the
size of the population in itself somehow had a positive eﬀect on the total factor productivity
in the various sectors.
4.4.1 Population and Technology
Over the years, a larger number of studies that deal with long-run growth and development
have argued that diminishing returns to labour are neutralised, or even reversed, due to the
fact that an increase in the size of the population has a positive eﬀect on the emergence of new
technology. This idea originates with Kuznets (1960), who argued that a larger population
contains more potential inventors; with Smith (1776), who attributed the adoption of more
productive technologies to the impetus of increasing specialisation and division of labour;
25and, not least, with Boserup (1965), who hypothesized that the increasingly intensive land-
use that follows from the pressure of an increasing population would supposedly lead to
a drop in labour productivity, following which, methods that raise productivity, such as
ploughing and fertilization, would be developed. A contribution by Kremer (1993) provides
a number of empirical tests that support the prediction that pre-industrial societies with
relatively large populations also enjoyed relatively fast technological growth. More recently,
Alcalà and Ciccone (2001) found that the size of the labour force in contemporary countries
positively inﬂuences labour eﬃciency.
In the following, we show that our framework can easily be extended so as to capture
this idea. In line with the construction in Galor and Mountford’s (2003) paper discussed
on page 5 above, we propose an extension by which we allow the size of the population to
positively inﬂuence not only the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity, as proposed
by Boserup, but the level of productivity in all of the sectors. We then demonstrate that
even if the eﬀect that an increasing population has on agricultural productivity is absent,
then the model is still able to explain the transfer of workers from agriculture to industry,
due to the eﬀect that a larger population has on the non-agrarian sectors’ productivity.
One of the papers that has recently argued for a model in which the growth rate and
therefore the level of technology can be linked to the size of the population is Jones (1998).10
Here, we propose a slightly modiﬁed version of Jones’ approach by assuming that the
10 Jones proposes a construction where the economy’s stock of knowledge, measured by the variable A,
g r o w sa c c o r d i n gt ot h er u l e ˙ At = δLt,w h e r eδ is the number of new ideas that each person discovers per unit
of time. This, in discrete time, means that At+1 = δLt +At, and is why the level of technology is positively
correlated with the size of the population.
26economy has an overall level of technology, denoted Ω, which increases with the size of the




Note that ε ∈ (0,1) implies that there are diminishing returns to labour in the creation of
new technology. As will become apparent below, the requirement that κ>N −ε is equivalent
to the assumption that Φ > 0 made on page 17.11
Next, inspired by the construction in Galor and Mountford (2003), we assume that the
overall level of technology, Ω,a ﬀects the level of productivity in all of the three sectors.12
However, the intensity with which each of the three sectors uses the overall level of technology
is not necessarily the same. More speciﬁcally, suppose that
Ωi = Ω
βi,β i ∈ [0,1),i = {A,D,M}, (18)
where βi is the intensity with which the overall technology is used in sector i = {A,D,M}.
We then propose the following result that emerges from inserting equations (6), (17) and
(18) into (16) and then diﬀerentiating with respect to N.
11 In Jones’ (1998) model, new technology occurs even in the absence of population growth. In the current
model, the level of technology that is available, measured by the variable Ω, increases only to the extent that
t h e r ei sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h esize of the population. What’s more, our construction, unlike that of Jones, implies
that a decline in the size of the population will actually result in a reduction in the level of technology that is
available to the economy. The relationship between population and technology promoted here is, therefore,
somewhat similar to the one that Smith (1776) had in mind, in which more people utilises more productivity
technologies due to the economies of scale that arise from specialisation and division of labour. Thus, our
framework, in contrast to the set-ups in the existing literature, is able to explain why major demographic
setbacks, such as the Black Death that eliminated one-third of Europe’s population during the fourteenth
century, led to a contraction of economic activity and to a lower degree of industrialisation. The idea that
the level of technology in a historical perspective regresses as a result of a reduction in population density is
well documented in a recent paper by Aiyar and Dalgaard (2002).
12 In Galor and Mountford’s model, the level of technology is positively inﬂuenced by labour’s skill intensity
(i.e., individual human capital) and by the level of technology in the previous period.
27Proposition 3 If (i) βA > (1 − α)/ε and ΩM > ΩD with Ωi being independent of N for
i ∈ {D,M},o ri f( i i )βA =0and βM > (1 − α)/αε + βD > (1 − α)/αε,t h e na ni n c r e a s e
in the size of the population, N, increases the degree of industrialisation, 1 − s.
Proposition 3 states that if the overall level of technology inﬂuences the total factor
productivity in the agricultural sector only, and if the eﬀect hereupon of an increase in the
size of the population is suﬃciently strong, then an increase in the size of the population
will stimulate the process of industrialisation.13
Although improvements in the agricultural sector’s total factor productivity are known
to have occurred throughout the pre-industrial era, this need not be the only force by which
workers were transferred from agriculture to industry. For reasons that were expounded
above, improvements in the industrial sector’s productivity, via an increase the number of
hours that a farmer chooses to spend in his ﬁelds, may also have added to the process of
industrialisation.
Suppose, therefore, that the eﬀect that the overall level of technology has on the agri-
cultural sector’s total factor productivity is turned oﬀ,a n dt h a ti to n l ya ﬀects the level of
productivity in the non-agrarian sectors. Then, provided that the industrial sector uses the
overall technology more eﬃciently than does the domestic sector (i.e., that βM >β D), this
means that an increase in the size of the population will stimulate the process of industrial-
isation, despite the lack of new agricultural technology being introduced.14
13 For a stylised representation that also captures this result, see Craft (1985a, pp. 117-118). Craft’s
model, however, is a one-sector framework, which only includes agricultural production.
14 Other combinations than those proposed in Proposion 3, for example, when the overall level of technology
inﬂuences the level of technology in all of the three sectors, may also give rise to an increasing degree of
industrialisation.
28Implicitly, the second part of Proposition 3 thus indicates that variations in occupation
structures across countries or regions, for example, at the time of the Industrial Revolution,
could result of diﬀerences in industrial technology rather than diﬀerences in agricultural
technology, which means that the farm households in the more densely populated regions
spend more hours of work in the ﬁelds.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper investigates the process of industrialisation with speciﬁcf o c u so nt h em a c r o
impact of the farm household’s decisions concerning its allocation of labour between agrarian
and non-agrarian activities. The work is inspired by the two important observations about
the pre-industrial economy made by Boserup (1965) and others, namely, that surplus labour
existed in agriculture and could be allocated in a variety of ways, and that agricultural
productivity was limited, not by the state of knowledge about how to increase output per
u n i to fl a n d ,b u tb yt h ef a c tt h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nf a r m l a n dp r o d u c t i v i t yc a m ea tac o s tt o
labour.
The main contribution in this paper is that productivity improvements in the industrial
sector, through changes in terms of trade between agricultural and industrial goods, make
farmers increase their output per unit of farmland by mobilising labour-resources from do-
mestic activities. The growth in the farmer’s food output expands the amount of food that
is traded in the market, which then increases the share of workers engaged in industrial
activities.
In eﬀect, the process of industrialisation in this paper is demand-driven. That is, improve-
29ments in the industrial sector’s productivity make farmers substitute non-agrarian goods
produced at home for similar goods that are produced by the industrial sector. The model
therefore explains why technological breakthroughs in industrial manufacture, such as the
mechanization of the English textile industry, would have intensiﬁed the use of farmland
and transferred workers from agriculture to industry, even in the absence of technological
breakthroughs in agriculture.
By assuming a positive link between the level of technology and the size of the population,
it is also shown that more densely populated regions will be more industrialised compared
to sparsely populated ones, even though they use the same agricultural technology, and that
the higher degrees of industrialisation in the more densely populated regions are achieved at
the expense of farmers’ spare-time activities.
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1800 9.1 3.23 35.5
Source: Allen (2000)
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